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Summary
This study was undertaken to explore the problems surrounding the human rights that
are usually regarded as the moral foundation of modern society. The values incorporated
in these human rights and the legal problems concerning their validity raise many
questions. To achieve an insight into these problems, this study regards human rights
as a product of the Western development of the law. The primary concern here is the
importance of this development and ways to put it into perspective, not by comparing
it with other law cultures, but by exploring the immanent dynamics of the Western
development itself. For this purpose, the tudy primarily regards the Western history (of
law) as a history of consciousness. The tertium comparationes for the description of this
development is the concept of human individuality. The issue of equality of rights is
used as the example that gives this study a concrete fo us. Th problems surrounding
equality of rights may be understood as fundamental to the understanding an
functioning of the law and at the same time—because of the existing uncertainty about
the meaning of equality as a legal principle—as a starting-point for putting Western
legal consciousness into perspective.
The formulation of Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution is a good example of the
problems surrounding the principle of equality of rights. This study therefore describes
the history of this formulation, from the installation of the Van Schaik Committee in
1956 to the formulation of the current Article 1 in 1983. The conclusion of this research
is that the issue of equality of rights appears to be tightly linked to all kinds of other
constitutional and technical legal issues. These include the meaning of legal principles
in a general sense and the role of the concepts of human individuality and human dignity
in the relationship between the individual and society. The study also describes the
relationship between equality of rights and issues such as liberty and the non-
discrimination principle, and continues with a discussion of the concept of the system
of law as such and the importance of legal principles for the development of the law as
part of the interplay between legislature, judiciary an  public administration. Finally, the
study discusses the meaning of fundamental rights, the relationship between classical
freedoms and social human rights and the importance of fundamental rights for the
system of law as a whole and the related importance of the principle of equality of
rights.
On the one hand the history of the formulation of Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution
provides an insight into the general problem of equality of rights, on the other hand it
also illustrates that issues relating to it could, to a large extent, not be resolved during
the preparation of the constitutional amendment and the ultimate formulation of Article
1. The impression is one of great confusion and insecurity about the meaning of equality
before the law. The adopted formulation of Article 1 did not resolve these issues in any
way, not only because of the existing differences of opinion but most of all through a
lack of conceptual clarity.
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The study therefore attempts to broaden the scope of the issue by connecting the concept
of equality with the concept of liberty and the concept of solidarity or fraternity. To this
end an interpretation is given of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen
of1789. This Declaration is seen as the legal form of the revolutionary slogan “liberté,
égalité, fraternité”. This exploration of equality in relation to the 1789 Declaration as
the document suprême of the French Revolution leads to the following conclusions.
When related to the principle of liberty, equality seems most of all to be the f rm of
the law. In that sense equality formalizes human relationships as an aspect of gener l
liberty. This creates a more complex vision of man, in the sense of what may be
distinguished as spatial. This vision of man is dualistic, with freedom of action and
freedom of speech on the one hand, and man’s ties to property as a reference to man’s
roots in the natural world on the other. This dualism is, to a certain extent, resolved into
a polarity by combining the two aspects in the functioning of the principle of equality.
In that sense, the two aspects of what it means to be human—which are represented by
opinion and property respectively and (implicitly) refer to notions such as the duality of
mind and nature—should be distinguished. This complicates the traditional vision of
man of seventeenth and eighteenth century natural law.
The scope of this study had then to be broadenedagain to include an exploration of the
development of the concept of equality as a result of a transformation of human
consciousness through the initial development of thought by the Greeks and the
development of law based on subjective will by the Romans.
The development of thought among the ancient Greeks resulted in a transition from the
original homoios equality to the isotes equality that should be understood as structure.
The concept of isotes equality is a product of rational thought and—under the influence
of the Sophists—accompanied a transition from the original natural philosophy concept
of the physis to the distinction between physis and nomos made by Plato and Aristotle.
Physis and nomos are rational concepts in which the relationship with pre-conceptual
reality has been severed. This led to the concept of geometric equality, in which the
original union of the homoios equality was pursued again by means of a reference to the
concept of justice, although the meaning of this concept cannot be determined. This
development accompanied the disappearance of the original social ferment of the polis,
which finally led to Greek particularism and the collapse of ancient Greek civilization.
Among the Romans original formulations of the concept of equality cannot be found;
neither do they reflect on this issue. On the contrary, Roman thought emphasizes the test
of strength as a natural phenomenon. Only if the result of the efforts made by each
Roman requires protection does the law emerge as an instrument to perpetuate the
relationships between citizens. Early Roman law does not mention equality. Any
equality to be found in the Roman system of law resides in the equal validity of the
power of each individual Roman. In the terminology adopted in this study this is referred
to as ‘equality of opportunities’. The law only sanctions the mutual validity of the
outcome of the power wielded by each Roman. The contradiction introduced in Roman
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society by this principle was eventually sublimated in the equal force of the law for all.
Ultimately the Roman empire collapsed, partly under the influence of its law system,
which prevented internal development and barred mutually beneficial contacts with other
cultures.
After the Greek and Roman cultures had thus faded away, the third phase of Ancient
development emerged: Antique Christianity. As far as equality is concerned, this
development led to a complete rev rsal of concepts. The thought-related structure of the
Greek isotes equality became incorporated into the dynamics of a ‘futurized’ equality ‘in
Christ’ of which history is the process, without this equality achieving concrete social
validity. The equality of opportunities associated with the will, however, became
superseded by the demand for a structuring of the will ruled by the commandment of
charity. Instead of being a socially effective principle, under early Christianity equality
became a moral imperative aimed at the subjective disposition of each individual,
separate from concrete social or political events.
Thus, equality, which the Ancient Greeks and Romans regarded as a primary
experience of mutual comparability, was converted into an issue of history and morality,
the concretization of the concept of justice as experienced by human consciousness. This
made history and morality both subject and content of the concept of equality. An
analysis of the relationship between equality and associated aspects of early Christianity
may lead to an understanding of this transition as a shift from (cosmic) universality to
(human) singularity.
This concludes the first part of the study. The second part consists of a search for a new
element that may be used in conjunction with the results of the first part to achieve a
better understanding of the concept of equality of rights.
To this end, the study explicitly links the above-mentioned singularity with the
development of human self-consciousness and concludes that this singularity exists as
the substance of the human ‘self’ that has become relevant in politics and legal systems
since the Middle Ages. An analysis of the dualistic structure of this substance—the
result of developments in Antiquity—leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to base
the development of the law in the form of human rights on the validity of each individual
as ‘self’. Because of its internal structure, the ‘self’ is only motivated by self-
preservation a d thus asocial in its relation to society and anti-social in its relation to
politics. The general nature of the human ‘self’ can therefore not attain any political and
legal validity and is only experinc d as a mystic ideal without practical relevance. This
phenomenon is regarded as a moral issue.
The study then states that the preliminary culmination of this development is formed
by the issue of morality as complete arbitrariness and negative liberty. This means that
in an ethical sense it is impossible to attribute other qualities to the will than the ability
to make choices, which (initially) precludes any perspective on a reality of the will more
inclusive than the individual, since the whole of reality can only be understood as
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(completely) encapsulated within the human self. Within each individual as ‘self’ there
can only exist complete arbitrariness expressed as absolute abstract liberty. At this point
the classical ontological concept of individuality as the essential element of the ‘self’ of
each individual has come to an end; i divi uum est ineffabile.
This brings us to the question of human individuality as ‘I’, which again points to the
importance of the Middle Ages. One can only become aware of this importance if the
Middle Ages are regarded as a true midpoint, i.e. a turning point between Antiquity and
New Era.
In pre-medieval development tie ransforms from an element of the cosmic order via
the humanization of history through myth to individual history through the development
of (rational) thought. This turns history into the realm of free action by the human
personality, but it also creates the tragedy that man is no longer embedded within a
context that provides rea onable purpose within history conceived as a general order of
events. Although this creates the freedom to act as one pleases, it also isolates the will
completely without the content of the will as such entering consciousness.
The study then presents a preliminary co cept of human individuality in which each
human being is conscious of his or her uniqueness and also feels connected with the
whole of reality that presents itself to him or her. As far as equality of rights is
concerned, this means that human individuality can only be characterized in conjunction
with the development of the law. To understand the law (and equality of rights under the
law) and human individuality one concept does not function as a given for the other;
instead, the meaning of both concepts should be determined in conjunction. This can
only be achieved if both are understood as developments. The beginning of this
development is situated in this study within the appearance of human individuality as
‘self’ with respect to morality.
Further development of this individuality is only possible and imaginable if the
concept of human individuality is understood as a praxis, as a moral category that exists
in open relationships with others. T is praxis is concerned with the transformation of
the substance of the ‘self’. This mean  that the issue of morality itself is none other than
an understanding of the initial human individuality as self, and may therefore be
characterized as an issue of choice. Simultaneously, the praxis or the development of
human individuality does not allow this issue to reside in a preference for either a
universal intellectualism or a contingent voluntarism. In both cases the development
would necessarily lead to a denial of human individuality. This means that a third
element should be introduced into the equation.
The possibility of a third element presupposes an a posteriori postulated end of the
development of human individuality as ‘I’ as the union of mankind, of which the
actuality somehow already forms the principle, so that the substance of the (initial)
human individuality of ‘self’ regarded as a dualism of universality (thought) and
contingency (will) may be understoo a  a union in which both elements are equal. This
leads to an explicit formulation of the epistemological problem of the ‘I’ as absolute
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equality, in which the ‘I’ is regarded as a practical concept. The ‘I’ is understood as the
(ultimate) equality of knowledge and action, i.e. as the union of the two. This union can
therefore initially only exist as a supposition, a c jecture of consciousness. In the
reality of this conjecture of consciousness lies the understanding of human dignity.
The development scheme mentioned may be formulated by means of the epistemology
of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1462), which interprets the acquisition of knowledge as a
process in which four steps may be distinguished: perception, representation,
knowing/not-knowing, and insight. These four elements satisfy the demand made on
thought by the legal system, namely that reality should play a role in thought even before
it has become conceptualized. This demand is satisfied by giving perception its own
position separate from thought within the knowledge process.
The actuality of the union of thought and will that initially exists only as a conjecture
for the thinking consciouness can be experienced as the sense of justice. Since the pre-
conscious initial union no longer possesses an ethical value within the development of
human individuality as ‘I’ and therefore cannot play a role either within an objective
evaluation of the course of this development, this sense of justice also forms the most
objective confirmation of the truth of this development. Because of this sense of justice
the pretence of the objectivity of thought and will within the course of this development
is exposed as an illusion.
The second part of the study concludes with an exploration of the concrete
development of the praxis of the initial human individuality by investigating the social
and political function of equality in the Renaissance. It appears that in the late Middle
Ages and the Renaissance equality was discovered as a basic experience within the
concrete interaction between individuals. However, the practical realization of equality
within the historical development appears to have been problematic and ultimately led
to royal absolutism and the notion of the raison d’état in which the union of thought and
will is realized in the abstract. Individual political equality as the individual right to
political action is ultimately confronted with the use of power and the concept of royal
or state sovereignty.
This ends the second part of the study. The last part is concerned with an attempt to
formulate a concept of equality appropriate to the constitutional state. The third part
therefore opens with a discussion of theories of equality formulated by Enlightenment,
Rationalist and Idealist thinkers in conjunction with their practical appli ation in law
and politics. The study explores the way in which these theories attempt to determine the
rational meaning of equality.
In the Enlightenment the experience of the preceding centuries is expressed in an
(always subjective) representation in conjunction with pre-medieval paradigms
concerning the determination of their meaning. With respect to equality in a genera
sense this also means that Enligh e ment theories only formulate a subjective or impure
concept of equality, in which the reality of the will cannot play a meaningful role
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because of the impossibility of making a distinction between perception and
representation. The result is a unilateral linking of equality and liberty. The ideal of
equality becomes the force of equality.
The next step is an investigation of attempts made to apply notions of reasonable
equality to the national constitutional state through the principle of the rule of law. It
appears that in practice this mainly results in greater socio-economic inequality. The
subsequent attempt to develop the concept for a rational control of the socio-economic
relations in combination with a scientific consciousness shaped by rationalism leads to
a ‘collapse of consciousness’, which turns the natural world into matter so that it comes
to be experienced as controllability on the basis of the laws attributed to it. This
precludes any opportunity for the development of solidarity or fraternity as a principle
of law. Repres ntational thought is thus not only both the origin and a typical attribute
of the constitutional state, it also threatens to destroy the constitutional state.
This brings us to the fundamentals that follow from the principle of the rule of law
within the development of the constitutional state: democracy and human rights. The
question here is whether democratic procedures and the validity of human rights can
overcome the deficiency created by the unimpaired application of the principle of formal
equality under the law in the constitutional state.
The instruments for democratic decision-making created during this development
appear as yet insufficient to counterbalance this deficiency within the twentieth-century
constitutional state. Again the cause for this inability seems to be representational
thought, which prevents the creation of a link between freedom and solidarity and
isolates individuals within their personal role as citizen. After the world wars, then, the
focus is on attempts to transform the fundamental rights of the constitutional state into
human rights, which may turn equality into a concrete legal praxis within the encounter
of individuals. These attempts appear to be in the initial stages and have so far hardly
led to a revaluation of the by now classical concept of the constitutional state.
The imperative of formal equality seems to exist primarily within the formality of state
interventions in the area of the traditional freedoms, consisting of the state’s ‘care’ for
the availability and accessibility not only of education and culture but of all matters that
in the eyes of the state are elements of the freedoms associated with thought, without any
interference with their contents. To achieve this insight, the unquestioningly accepted
but inadequate idea that the traditional freedoms requir  state abstinence and basic social
rights require state interference should be abandoned.
As far as the development of the law as human law is concerned, material equality
seems to consist primarily of a re-attachment of each individual with the (all) products
of his or her labour and secondly with the equality of the bargaining positions taken by
consumers and producers in the negotiations concerning economic production. Material
equality refers to an equality that is determined by the distinction resulting from th
suum of each human being, as expressed by his or her desires and labour. Materia
equality points to the congruence between this distinction and the bargaining positions
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of producers and consumers and has nothing to do with equality of material rights.
In the light of the above, geometric equality as the ‘sep ration of Zeus’ may once again
come into force in the democratic constitutional state as the geometry of concrete
arbitration. For the sake of the constitutional concept of democracy as a guarantee for
the geometry of equality, an important conclusion with respect to the issue of equality
seems to be the necessity for the government to withdraw to the area of its legitimate
authority when it comes to the equality of legal positions. This also sums up the
conjectural nature of equality as a human right and at the same time puts the importance
of the Western development of the legal consciousness into perspective. An
advancement of equality of rights therefore not only requires less state intervention but
also the unimpaired access of ‘all’ to all law cultures.
